Incentivizing Technological Growth: A Symbiotic Relationship in the Computer Software Industry by Usher, Alex
Economics, Department of
Economics Theses
University of Puget Sound Year 
Incentivizing Technological Growth: A
Symbiotic Relationship in the Computer
Software Industry
Alex Usher
University of Puget Sound
This paper is posted at Sound Ideas.
http://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/economics theses/81
 
 
 
Incentivizing Technological Growth: A Symbiotic Relationship in the 
Computer Software Industry 
 
 
Alex Usher 
12/16/2010 
 
 
 
  
 
2 
 
I. Introduction 
It is difficult to argue that any given person goes more than a day without exploiting the 
advancements of computer software technology.  Whether it is from the newest release of 
the video game Call of Duty or the innovative “Snap” feature in Windows 7, people benefit 
daily from the progression of software innovation.   Software is generally defined as a 
collection of written programs and procedures, usually referred to as code, that instruct a 
computer what to do. With household computer and internet access up to 68 percent in 
2009 and computer software engineer employment expected to increase by 32 percent in 
the next 10 years, it is also difficult to ignore the growing importance of the software 
industry in the nation’s economy1 (Computer Use and Ownership) (Computer Software 
Engineers ). It is for this reason, economists have been investigating the economics of the 
software industry and the role of intellectual property rights in the high rate of 
technological growth.   
Of particular interest to many researchers is the notion of the open source software 
communities and their ability, and willingness, to stimulate innovation without taking 
advantage of traditional copyrights or patents.  Open source communities consist of 
developers, sometimes at several different locations or organizations, sharing program 
code and making it freely accessible to copy, study, refine and modify (Lerner & Jean, 
2002).Conversely, proprietary software is exclusively the property of its developers and 
                                                          
1
  According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the expected growth of employment in software engineering is much 
faster than the average of all other occupations. Already holding approximately 1.3 million jobs in 2008, computer 
software programmers and engineers are expected to see more than 300,000 new jobs created in the next 10 
years. 
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copyrighted or patented against exploitation and duplication. Open source software 
development has obvious cost-saving traits; stemming from high knowledge diffusion, code 
reuse, and lowered transaction costs, that proprietary firms cannot replicate but could 
potentially benefit from.   
While proprietary firms and open source communities exhibit many differences, 
their existence in the computer software industry causes them to both experience a unique 
industry trait; a high knowledge-based market. The software industry is characterized by 
network externalities and first-mover advantages that cause innovation to be the key to a 
firm’s success. As a result of these characteristics, new proprietary firms, motivated by the 
promise of high profits, can only enter and survive in the market with innovative products.  
 Logically, two questions arise from the notion of open source: Why would developers 
chose to participate in programming without the incentives of proprietary code or the 
ability to gain profit from its sale? Secondly,  if open source software programmers have 
strong enough motivations to innovate without profit compensation and do it at lower 
costs than proprietary firms, what is the need for patents or copyrights?  Economists have 
found the motivations of open source software, or OSS, developers of particular interest 
and have conducted several studies on the topic.2 Generally, findings show that a large 
motivation of OSS programmers is the ability to clearly signal their skills to potential 
employers through the visibility of open source code.  By and large, these employers are 
proprietary firms, who can afford to hire these programmers due to the profits gained from 
securing forms of protection of intellectual property rights and then selling software. 
                                                          
2
 Details and findings of these studies will be discussed later in the paper during the literature review.  
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Copyrights and patents allow proprietary firms to invest in research and development 
without having to worry about the public good characteristics of computer software 
leading to free riders undermining their profits.  Public goods are goods that exhibit 
nondiminishability and nonexcludability allowing free riders take advantage of these 
properties by reaping the benefits of one firm’s innovations without experiencing any 
costs. (Riddell, Shackelford, Schneider, & Stamos, 2009).3   
Subsequently, even though OSS communities innovate at lower costs, they rely heavily 
on potential job opportunity motivations from proprietary firms who, in turn, are 
dependent on copyrights.  While copyrights overcome the public good nature of computer 
software, it also leads to preventable higher fixed costs.  I will illustrate that open source 
software firms help reduce these costs, but would struggle to exist and succeed without the 
incentives provided from the proprietary industry. By lowering costs, profits for 
proprietary firms increase which stimulates entry and innovation in the software market. 
Therefore, a mixed market is favorable due to the interdependence and symbiotic 
relationship of the two markets inducing lower costs that allow the computer software 
industry to maintain a high level of technological growth.    
The paper’s discussion is structured as follows.  In Section II I will review relevant 
literature and note important observations and/or findings.  The literature review will also 
offer a closer look into open source communities by assessing information previous 
                                                          
3
  Nondiminishability refers to the property that one person’s consumption does not restrict the amount of any 
other persons.  Nonexcludability refers to the property where “nonpayers” cannot be excluded from using the 
good.  
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researchers have acquired on OSS motivations, operations, and cost-saving behaviors.  In 
Section III I will investigate the market failure issues behind the unique characteristics of 
the software industry and conceptualize the problem diagrammatically. Next, in Section IV 
I will introduce and examine the symbiotic relationship between open source communities 
and the resulting profits that lead to a higher level of innovation.  Lastly, in Section V I will 
address limitations of the paper and, finally, I will discuss policy implications in Section VI 
and Section VII I will conclude.    
 
II. Literature Review 
It is important to acknowledge the relationship between the direction of this paper and 
studies in earlier literature to understand how this research is relevant to current research 
in the economics of computer science and to demonstrate how this particular argument 
offers a new analysis.  The relevant literature is separated into two general topics; (i) 
Motivations behind Open Source Communities and (ii) Benefits derived from OSS.  Some 
literature falls into more than once category.  
 
(i) Motivations behind Open Source Communities 
The development of open source communities astonished and intrigued economists 
from the very beginning. It is imperative to understand the underlining incentives for open 
source developers’ since their motivations are arguably the one of the causes for open 
source communities’ dependence on proprietary firms.  Frestchman and Gandal (2007) 
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investigate this “economic paradox” with an empirical study and survey of open source 
developers. They find that output per contributor in OSS projects is higher with less 
restrictive licenses, implying that the programmers have signaling and status incentives for 
participating in OSS projects. 
Similarly, Lerner and Jean (2002) suggest that even though the “media like(s) to portray 
the open source community  as wanting to help mankind, as it makes a good story” ,  an 
explanation based on altruism can only go so far (Lerner & Jean, 2002, p. 2). As a result, 
they explore the incentives behind OSS and report that there are two distinct motivations; 
career concerns and ego gratification. “Career concerns” reflects the notion of potential job 
opportunities resulting from the developer being able to signal his/her skills by being 
named directly as a contributor to a highly visible piece of programming.  Hiring companies 
are able to evaluate a programmer’s skills, creativity and initiative because the source code 
is free to view.  Lerner and Jean (2002) go on to explain that peer recognition is what spurs 
an “ego gratification” incentive to participate in OSS projects; contributors are able to 
signal to their ability to fellow peers.  
 Bizter and Schroder (2007) take this one step further, suggesting that the combination 
of ego gratification and career concern signaling results in a motivation to produce higher 
quality programming work than that of a proprietary firm. They also discuss the 
motivation of the “nature of voluntarism”; explaining that people usually contribute to 
projects they enjoy doing. This also relates to the argument of altruism as a potential 
incentive to contributing to OSS development. Collectively, all of these findings offer insight 
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into the OSS communities and their motivation from potential career opportunities that 
proprietary firms offer.  
 
(ii) Benefits derived from OSS 
Generally speaking, most of the literature regarding OSS benefits advocated that the 
largest gain to be had from implementing open source software was associated with cost-
saving characteristics.  By demonstrating that open source communities innovate at lower 
costs, I can point that their existence reduces costs and subsequently increases profits in 
the software industry.  
 Returning to Bitzer and Schroder’s research, they suggest that signaling motivation 
behind open source contributors help lower development costs. This is accomplished by 
generating higher quality work, due to career/ego concerns, which results in lower future 
debugging costs and lessens the need for technical support.4 In their research Bitzer and 
Schroder(2007) also coin the term “boundless cooperation”,  referring to  the idea that “ 
because commercial exploitation of newly developed software is not intended, there is no 
need to keep new ideas secret and therefore barriers against cooperation do not arise”.  
Boundless cooperation leads to lower costs by inducing high knowledge diffusion and 
prompts combinations of complementary programming skills. The concept of boundless 
cooperation in open source software also allows for basic code reuse. This idea supports 
the argument of lowering innovation costs by lowering the time needed to code certain 
                                                          
4
  Debugging refers to fixing “bugs”, or defects, in computer program code.  
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programs. This lessens a developer’s opportunity cost of writing the program, allowing 
them to quickly move onto novel coding aspects.  
 Similar to Bitzer and Schroder’s analysis of OSS benefits, Lerner and Jean (2002) 
discuss the advantages of lowering costs through cooperation. They discuss the idea of 
forking, the “splitting of projects into competing developmental streams” and how while 
forking can be beneficial, it is a delicate balance that sometimes turns into a destructive 
process. This could happen if competing streams get into disputes about the project, 
leading to the development of two entirely different programs created for the same 
purpose, which is clearly a waste of resources.  Lastly, Mendez-Duron and Garcia (2009) 
use social capital, or knowledge flows, to show that investment in OSS communities and the 
knowledge flows they cultivate results in higher returns.5 They also suggest that some of 
these knowledge flows can support healthy forking within communities.  
While most of the economic literature investigates OSS and the benefits that are derived 
from its development, none demonstrate the goal of this paper to show how these benefits 
can lead to maintaining a higher level of technological growth in a symbiotic mixed market. 
 
III. Knowledge Spillovers and Market Failure in Proprietary Software 
With a knowledge intensive industry such as software engineering, the exchange of 
ideas, or knowledge spillovers, are almost impossible to avoid and can cause serious 
problems within a market.  It is important to understand the difference between internal 
                                                          
5
 Medez-Duron and Garcia define social capital as  “ the actual potential resources embedded in relationships 
amoung actors” or “knowledge flows”. They also define “returns” as the projects diffusion over the network.  
9 
 
knowledge spillovers and external knowledge spillovers, for they have very different 
economic implications. Internal knowledge spillovers are interparty exchanges of ideas 
that can facilitate “creation of new related goods and new ways of producing existing 
goods” (Carlino, 2001, p. 17). Not surprisingly, internal knowledge spillovers, or what 
Mendez-Duron and Garcia(2009) called knowledge flows, are exactly what helps open 
source software practice healthy forking strategies and experience high levels of 
innovation. Additionally, the significance of these knowledge spillovers is what causes the 
software industry to rely so heavily on innovation. 
However, in opposition, external knowledge spillovers are exchanges of ideas between 
two different, competing parties.  External knowledge spillovers could allow outside 
companies or firms to benefit from one firm’s innovations without incurring any of the 
costs associated with research and development. This concept is referred to as a positive 
externality and in section one of this paper this idea was discussed in relation to public 
goods and free riders.6  Positive externalities tend to lead to an underallocation of 
resources and result in less than the socially desirable amount of a good or, in the worst 
cases, even no production (Riddell, Shackelford, Schneider, & Stamos, 2009). Copyrights 
and patents allow innovators to internalize these positive externalities by restricting 
outside parties use, visibility, or replication of a good.  More specifically, firms can charge 
for use of copyrighted or patented information and payments to the firm help them 
internalize the external benefits. 
                                                          
6
  A positive externality is formally defined as when benefits are reaped by a third party; one that is not directly 
involved in the transaction.   
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The concept of positive externalities in intellectual property rights can be applied 
directly to the software industry. Despite the obvious social benefit, the computer software 
industry experiences little or no demand from the consumers due to free riders taking 
advantage of positive externalities.  Without demand there is no profit, and without profit 
there is no incentive for firms to produce, even though there is social benefit to be gained. 
This can result in a social welfare loss; a market failure where it is possible to reallocate 
resources to better the society. This market failure can be illustrated diagrammatically for 
the proprietary software industry; however an understanding of software firm’s unique 
marginal costs is needed first.  
Marginal cost is defined as the change in total cost that results from a one-unit 
change in output (Frank, 2008). In the case of software production, the duplication (or 
creation of another unit of software) of a program is as simple as just writing another disk.7 
The cost of this process is so small that it has virtually no effect on the total cost of 
operation for a proprietary software firm.  As a result of this, the marginal cost can be 
thought to be essentially zero in the computer software industry. Given this information, 
the proprietary software market – with no intellectual property rights – can be shown in 
the following diagram: 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 This process is also referred to as burning to a  CD.  
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It can be seen in the diagram that market’s optimal equilibrium, where social marginal 
benefit (SMB) intersects the social marginal cost curve (SMC), is at (Q*, P*). However, as 
mentioned earlier, with no copyrights or patents to protect against free-riding there will be 
no demand, resulting in no production. This causes the actual equilibrium (Qe,Pe) to be at 
(0,0) where there is no production despite the products ability to provide social benefit. 
Consequently, the market failure can be thought as the forgone benefit of not producing at 
the optimal level of Q* and is depicted in the diagram as a social welfare loss (shaded 
triangle).  
In an attempt to internalize these benefits and eliminate a free-rider problem, 
copyrights and patents were introduced to the computer software industry. By abolishing 
Proprietary Software - 
No Copyrights/Patents 
Figure 1 
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Software (Q) 
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free-riders, copyrights and patents take away consumers ability to enjoy software products 
without incurring costs.  However, since there is still a benefit from the programs to be had, 
consumers are forced to pay an amount, based on their willingness and ability, for the 
software and therefore creating a demand in the market that is equal to the marginal social 
benefit of the programs.  Again, this can be depicted graphically: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In figure two, the traditional economic theory of monopoly power derived from 
copyrights is assumed, resulting in the marginal revenue curve having twice the slope of 
the demand curve.8 Under monopoly assumptions, the market determined equilibrium is 
                                                          
8
  Marginal revenue is the amount of total revenue gained after a one unit increase in output (Frank, 2008). 
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found at quantity Q2* and price P2*.  It can be seen that the protection provided by 
copyrights and patents allow for the market to experience a positive equilibrium and 
capture both a consumer and producer surplus (CS and PS, respectively) as well as 
ultimately allowing a firm to experience profits.  Additionally, the diagram shows that 
although there is still a social welfare loss associated with the monopoly power derived 
from patent protection, the loss is significantly less than the industry without copyrights or 
patents depicted in Figure 1.   
While copyrights and patents help establish a better market for the computer software 
industry, they also help stimulate innovation.  Firms are unable to invest in research and 
development if they do not have the funding from their profits and they do not experience 
profit without copyright/patent protection. More specifically, Figure 2 illustrated the 
creation of a producer surplus, also known to be equal to total fixed costs plus profit, after 
the copyrights are introduced. With the profits being made, firms are enticed to enter the 
market and due to the nature of the software industry, a firm can only enter this type of a 
market with innovative products, thus the promise of high profits provides a large 
incentive to innovate. Conclusively, it is shown that copyrights and patents induce profits 
that enable firms to sustain the high level of innovation the industry demands. 
 
IV. Proprietary and Open Source : A Symbiotic Relationship 
In order to examine the effect of OSS communities in the software market, the 
relationship of open source and proprietary firms needs to be investigated. After reviewing 
previous literature and research in the computer software industry, it became apparent 
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that there existed an interdependent, complementary connection between the two types of 
parties. The most applicable term for the relationship seemed to be symbiotic; defined as a 
mutually beneficial relationship between different people or groups (Oxford Dictionaries). 
In this specific case, it is evident that proprietary firms derive benefits from open source 
communities while OSS developers simultaneously obtain benefits from those proprietary 
firms. In this section of the paper both sides of this relationship will be investigated and 
clarified to support the theory of a symbiotic relationship.  
Initially, let us examine the prospect of open source developers, and their communities, 
benefiting from proprietary firms. As introduced during the review of literature, it has been 
reasoned that OSS contributors have two main motivations that overshadow altruistic 
incentives; career concerns and ego gratification (Fershtman & Gandal, 2007). Both of 
these incentives refer to the developer’s ability to signal his/her skills (to either a potential 
employer or fellow peer) due to the extreme visibility of the software and the convention 
which credits the authors by name. While this illustrates a definite reliance on proprietary 
firms, it does not explicitly illustrate the benefits OSS communities are deriving from the 
companies.  In order to understand these benefits, the implications of potential job 
opportunities motivating developers needs to be explored.  Recall that earlier during the 
discussion of OSS benefits, it was noted that career incentives motivate open source 
developers to produce higher quality software. Furthermore, this superior quality of code 
induces lower costs by lessening the need for technical support and debugging (Bitzer & 
Schroder, 2007). It should also be noted that these lower costs may be experienced in the 
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development of new and innovative software because higher quality code allows for a more 
stable foundation for advancement. Lastly, it can now be recognized that this beneficial 
cost reduction in innovation ultimately stems from the proprietary firms interaction with 
open source communities because the firms are the subjects inducing cost-saving behavior.  
Given that open source communities benefit from proprietary firms has been 
established, the reverse can be considered. The most obvious potential gain proprietary 
firms could obtain from open source developers is through their unpatented innovations. 
Without any property rights preventing proprietary firms from exploiting the visibility and 
availability of OSS code, they could utilize the information in beneficial way or even employ 
it to spur their own innovation.  
However, the specific licenses used by the OSS communities may dictate the extent to 
which others, particularly proprietary firms, can benefit from the code by restricting 
certain aspects or uses. There are two general types of open source licenses: permissive 
and non-permissive. Non-permissive licenses, also referred to as copyleft or GNU licenses, 
require that all derived works can only be distributed under the same license terms9. This 
indicates that an open source software program must remain open source after 
modifications or supplementations if it is being shared or sold. Conversely, permissive 
licenses allow derived works to be redistributed on more restrictive license terms. For 
example, an OSS program protected under a permissive license does not require derived 
works to be open source code.  (Lerner & Jean, 2002). 
                                                          
9
 GNU is a General Public License used widely with the software industry. 
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Nevertheless, proprietary firms can still benefit from OSS communities despite which 
open source licenses they encounter. By either direct exploitation of the open source code 
or by indirectly employing its concepts, proprietary developers can benefit from OSS 
communities the same way open source contributors benefit from their own work. They 
can experience lower costs by code reuse, favorable knowledge diffusion, and 
combinations of complementary programming skills; all of which lower costs of innovation 
and code development. Consequently, these observations support the idea that open 
source communities and proprietary firms experience a symbiotic relationship.  
 After investigation of both sides of the relationship, it can be noted that almost all the 
benefits resulting from the symbiotic bond between OSS and proprietary firms are actually 
reductions in costs, particularly in the creation and innovation of new software. If we now 
take the previous diagram for the software market into back into consideration, we can 
capture the innovation implications of open source communities’ existence in the software 
industry. Again, it was concluded that the symbiotic nature of proprietary and OSS caused 
benefits in the form of lower costs.  
Recall that with no marginal costs present for software firms, these lowered costs must 
be experience in firms’ total fixed costs (TFC). Additionally, if these costs are only affecting 
TFC, a curve that was not incorporated in either diagram, than the producer surplus 
formed in Figure 2 is not changing with the introduction of OSS communities to the 
software market. This indicates that the amount of producer surplus is not changing even 
though total fixed costs are decreasing. For this to be possible, given that producer surplus 
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is equal to TFC plus profit as established earlier, profits must be increasing. With profits 
increasing, further entry into the market is experienced and with this entry comes even 
more innovative products.  
Ultimately, open source communities’ entrance into the market allows for proprietary 
firms to enhance their profitability, thus increasing incentives to innovate within the 
computer software industry. This analysis suggests that with a mixed market of both 
proprietary firms and open source software communities, the computer software industry 
can reach a higher level of technological growth by exploiting the lower costs derived from 
a symbiotic relationship.  
 
V. Limitations 
As with all research, there are some small limitations that accompany the theories and 
that sometimes condition relevant findings.  In this paper’s case, the foremost limitation is 
the narrowed focus on a very simplistic, pure mixed market of only two types of firms 
within the computer software industry; proprietary and OSS communities. Other research 
has been conducted on the distinction between open source communities and open source 
firms; the key difference stemming from the pursuit of profit by OSS firms (Linus 
Dahlander, 2005). However, this paper only analyzes the relationship of OSS communities 
and proprietary firms in the research and development market.  
Similar to the narrowed focus of just one branch of open source population, this paper 
also only investigated one type of proprietary firm; the firms that do not exercise any of its 
own open source initiatives.  Some companies have recognized the symbiotic relationship 
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between OSS and proprietary and have established their own affiliated open source 
communities or sectors within their firm10 (Campbell-Kelly & Swartz, 2010).  Dahlander 
and Magnussion (2005) go into investigate the managerial requirements that make it 
possible to cultivate a symbiotic relationship, rather than commenalistic or parasitic, in this 
type of situation.  
While both of these factors are limitations, they still provide insight into the validity of 
argument presented in the paper. It is argued that a mixed market provides a higher, 
socially desirable level of technological growth in the form of more effective software. In an 
industry characterized by network externalities and first-mover advantages, innovation is 
key to a firm’s success.  It is apparent that companies and communities have realized the 
advantages of a mixed market and have begun trying to cultivate these benefits through 
mixed firms to achieve higher levels of innovation.  
 
VI. Policy Implications 
While this paper does not lead up to explicit policy suggestions or critiques, its results 
have a relatively general implication.  The conclusions demonstrate that the computer 
software industry thrives as a mixed market. The symbiotic relationship is a crucial 
component in technological growth and its contribution to the success of the software 
industry needs to be taken into consideration before any policies are enacted. Whether it 
                                                          
10
  Interestingly, Cambell-Kelly and Garcia-Swartz (2010) argue that there will soon be a “convergence to the 
middle” of open source and proprietary industries; implying that there will no longer be two separate industries. 
They believe all firms will exploit the benefits of both open source and proprietary programming.  
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entails changes in copyrights and patents or alterations to open source licenses, policies 
that aim to only influence one particular group of developers will ultimately affect the 
entire software industry due to the connection and beneficial relationship OSS and 
proprietary firms enjoy. It is for this reason that policy implementations or modifications 
need to be taken into serious consideration beforehand.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
The atypical economic characteristics in the software industry, and open source 
attributes in particular, have raised several intriguing questions over the past few years. 
Open source communities’ success, operations, and even existent have been the focus of 
many research papers in the economic discipline. As a result of this, a review of previous 
literature was used to establish the motivations behind contribution to open source 
projects and the benefits that can result from the operations of their communities. It was 
found that a major motivating factor for OSS developers was the opportunity to better 
signal their programming abilities to potential employers, i.e.  proprietary companies.  
Subsequently, these incentives allowed open source communities to experience lower 
technical support and debugging costs as a result of producing higher quality code created 
to demonstrate their level of coding capability. OSS groups acquired even more cost 
reductions in innovation from constructive knowledge flows, code reuse and the 
implications of “boundless cooperation”.   
 After analyzing the success of open source communities in technological growth, 
proprietary firms’ reliance on copyrights and patents was questioned. However, it was then 
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shown diagrammatically that proprietary firms use these rights to internalize the positive 
externalities, create a consumer demand, and thus gain profit from a monopolistic power 
over their products.  By employing copyrights or patents, proprietary companies are 
incentivized to maintain a higher level of technological growth.  
 Lastly, it was argued that even though open source communities can achieve a high 
level of innovation at lower costs than proprietary firms, they would not be able to succeed 
or maintain a high level of innovation without them. This is because OSS would not be has 
beneficial if it were not for the career incentives provided by proprietary firms that 
motivate programmers to contribute high quality work to open source projects in the first 
place. The apparent interdependence of the two firms was confirmed after exploring the 
possibility that proprietary firms could be benefiting from interactions with OSS 
communities and developers. It was established that proprietary companies in fact acquire 
lower innovation costs derived from the exploitation of open source projects; the extent of 
such depending on varying OSS licenses.  Collectively, the lower costs of innovation being 
experienced in both open source communities and proprietary firms prompted analysis of 
its effect in the previously discussed diagrams. Using the analytics from before, it was 
shown that with a symbiotic-natured mixed market of OSS communities and proprietary 
companies, the total fixed cost of firms decreases; thus allowing for a higher profits and 
greater incentive for technological growth. 
 While the implication of further stimulating technological growth as result of a 
mixed market has its merits, further research could be done.  As mentioned earlier in 
regards to limitations of the paper, some companies have acknowledge the symbiotic 
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nature of the computer software industry and have began incorporating open source 
communities and initiatives in their own firms.  Some researchers suggest that there will 
ultimately be a convergence of industries and that all firms will incorporate both open 
source and proprietary coding into their companies. It would be valuable to investigate 
whether this convergence is plausible and if it would lessen, maintain, or increase the 
current level of technological growth.  Nevertheless, the computer software industry is 
currently operating at a high level of technological growth and will continue to do so by 
utilizing the symbiotic nature of the relationship between proprietary firms and open 
source software communities.   
  
22 
 
Works Cited 
Bitzer, J., & Schroder, P. J. (2007). Open Source Software, Competition and Innovation. Industry and 
Innovation , 14 (5), 461-476. 
Campbell-Kelly, M., & Swartz, D. G. (2010). The Move to the Middle: Convergence of the Open 
Source and Proprietary Software Industries. International Journal of the Economics of Business , 
223-252. 
Carlino, G. A. (2001). Knowledge Spillovers: Cities' Role in the New Economy. Business Review , 17-
27. 
Computer Software Engineers . (n.d.). Retrieved November 7, 2010, from Bureau of Labor Statistics: 
http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos303.htm 
Computer Use and Ownership. (n.d.). Retrieved November 7, 2010, from US Census Bureau: 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/computer.html 
Fershtman, C., & Gandal, N. (2007). Open Source Software: Motivation and Restrictive Licensing. 
International Economics and Economic Policy , 4 (2), 209-225. 
Frank, R. (2008). Microeconomics and Behavior . New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Garzarelli. (2008). Open source software and economic growth: A classical division of labor 
perspective. Information Technology for Development , 14 (2), 116-135. 
Henkel, J. (2009). Champions of Revealing--The Role of Open Source Developers in Commercial 
Firms. Industrial and Corporate Change , 18 (3), 435-471. 
Lerner, J., & Jean, T. (2002). The Simple Economics of Open Source. Journal of industrial Economics , 
50 (2), 197-234. 
Linus Dahlander, M. G. (2005). Relationships between open source software companies and 
communties: Observations from Nordic firms. Elsevier , 482-493. 
Mendez-Duron, R., & Garcia, C. E. (2009). Returns from Social Capital in Open Source Software 
Networks. Journal of Evolutionary Economics , 19 (2), 277-295. 
Open Source Licenses. (n.d.). Retrieved November 10, 2010, from Open Source Initiative : 
http://www.opensource.org/docs/osd 
23 
 
Orman, W. H. (2008). Giving it Away for Free? The Nature of Job-Market Signaling by Open-Source 
Software Developers. B.E. Journal of Economic Analyaia and Policy , 8 (1). 
Oxford Dictionaries. (n.d.). Retrieved November 10, 2010, from 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m_en_us1296460#m_en_us1296460.00 
Riddell, T., Shackelford, J., Schneider, G., & Stamos, S. (2009). Economincs: A Tool for Critically 
Understanding Society. Boston: Pearson. 
 
